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Bergenfield v. Bank of America, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 40 (June 6, 2013)1 
 
REAL ESTATE FINANCE – MEDIATION, NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE 
 
Summary 
 
 This is an appeal from a district court order denying a petition for judicial review in a 
Foreclosure Mediation Program matter.    
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
In Nevada’s Foreclosure Mediation Program, where a deed of trust and promissory note 
are held by different entities, the note holder’s sole attendance at the mediation is insufficient to 
satisfy the statutory requirement that the deed of trust beneficiary also attend and participate in 
the mediation. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 Marcia Bergenfield obtained a home loan from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., and 
executed a promissory note in Countrywide’s favor.  The note was secured by a deed of trust that 
listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as the beneficiary.  MERS 
subsequently assigned the deed of trust to HSBC Bank USA.  Countrywide endorsed the 
promissory note in blank, giving the possessor of the note entitlement to payment.  Bank of 
America then acquired Countrywide. 
 
 Bergenfield defaulted on the note and elected to participate in the Foreclosure Mediation 
Program (FMP).  HSBC did not send a representative to the mediation, but BAC Home Loans 
Servicing appeared on behalf of Bank of America.  The parties at mediation were unable to reach 
an agreement, and Bergenfield filed a petition for judicial review.  The district court denied the 
petition on the basis that the statutory requirements were met—the parties had addressed the 
document production issues to the court’s satisfaction, BAC had the authority to negotiate, and 
participated in good faith. 
   
Discussion 
 
Nevada law permits the severance and independent transfer of a deed of trust and 
promissory note without affecting the right to ultimately foreclose.2  Thus it was permissible for 
Bank of America to hold the note, and for HSBC to remain beneficiary of the deed of trust.  
However, in a nonjudicial foreclosure, the party seeking to foreclose must be both the note 
holder, and the beneficiary of the deed of trust.3  NRS 107.086(4) mandates that a deed of trust 
beneficiary must attend the mediation itself or through a representative either with authority to 
modify the loan, or with unfettered access to a person with such authority.4  If the deed of trust 
                                                
1  By Christopher J. Humphrey. 
2 Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 128 Nev. ___, ___, 286 P.3d 249, 258-60 (2012). 
3 Id. 
4 Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 127 Nev. ___, ___, 255 P.3d 1275, 1278 (2011). 
beneficiary fails to attend the mediation, the FMP certificate must not issue.5  Bank of America 
was not the beneficiary of the deed of trust, and therefore failed to demonstrate authority to 
nonjudicially foreclose and participate in the FMP mediation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The district court erred when it determined that Bank of America had the authority to 
mediate and when it denied Appellant’s petition for judicial review.  The Court reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings. 
   
                                                
5 Holt v. Reg’l Tr. Servs. Corp., 127 Nev. ___, ___, 266 P.3d 602, 606-07 (2011). 
